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Russian nationalism and foreign policy: the regime nexus1 
Luke March 
 
 
‘Nationalism’ is one of the most poorly understood themes in the analysis of Russian 
foreign policy (RFP). Many accounts do not recognise the concept, arguing that RFP is 
rational, pragmatic and interest-based. For others, nationalism has become ever more 
dominant in Putin-era politics. However, accounts that investigate nationalism and 
foreign policy specifically in depth are relatively few. Indeed, most either look at 
nationalism as one, often marginal, offshoot of RFP generally, or have an explicit 
domestic focus (e.g. nationalist intellectuals, movements, political parties or 
subcultures) with little direct engagement with RFP. Many accounts that do engage 
with nationalism and RFP do in a normative, alarmist and stereotypical way, where 
nationalism is an omnipresent but ill-defined threat, conflated with aggression, 
imperialism and general mischief-making.  
Such divergent approaches have very different implications for such central 
questions as what motivates RFP, what is the role of domestic politics therein, what are 
the factors of continuity and change in Russian and Soviet foreign policy, and what are 
the implications of specific foreign policy actions (especially towards Ukraine after the 
2014 annexation of Crimea). Unpicking the role of nationalism is thus (or should be) a 
central concern. 
 This chapter discusses different approaches to nationalism and RFP. In the first 
section, it outlines definitional issues and justifies the concept of nationalism used. The 
second section then analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the main approaches 
towards nationalism and RFP espoused by the main theoretical ‘schools’ of RFP 
analysis (realist, constructivist and liberal approaches). The following section argues 
that only multilevel and theoretically eclectic regime-focussed approaches which 
explicitly explore the intersections between nationalism, domestic and foreign policy 
can give a sufficiently measured, nuanced and non-normative analysis; the fourth 
section outlines some testable hypotheses resulting from this approach; the fifth 
highlights some future areas for research; the final section concludes. 
This chapter’s over-riding argument is that nationalism is a valuable but often 
misrepresented focus of RFP research. First, nationalism cannot be a parsimonious 
prism through which to interpret the entirety of RFP, and above all foreign policy 
behaviour. Second, prevalent approaches which attribute homogeneity and uniformity 
to nationalism as somehow a ‘driver’ of foreign policy are among the most simplistic 
and contentious. Third, this notwithstanding, nationalism provides a vital addition to 
the palette of approaches to understanding RFP. Its main virtue is its ability, when 
accurately defined and utilised, to identify the linkages between domestic values, 
regime structures and foreign policy discourses.   
 
 ‘Nationalist’ foreign policy – defining the undefinable?  
 
There is a significant conceptual problem with identifying nationalism as practised by 
states, rather than non-state groups. As John Breuilly argues (1993, pp. 10–11), 
‘nationalist’ states are in the eye of the beholder: those whose policies defend  ‘national 
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interests’ and which other states might regard as ‘assertive’ or ‘aggressive’ are so 
universal that ‘governmental nationalism’ is a meaningless category unless there is an 
obvious, direct link between government and a nationalist movement. As outlined 
below, in Russia, such an obvious link has rarely existed. The problem is compounded 
because many analysts approach nationalism in a profoundly normative, even 
Orientalist way (Laruelle, 2014); indeed there has long been a central argument that 
Russian nationalism is uniquely negative; revanchist and aggressive, alongside a 
research stream exposing the individuals or ideas who support such views (e.g. 
Allensworth, 1998; Yanov, 1995). Adding to the complexity is the tendency for states 
to refer to their own nationally-oriented policies as ‘patriotic’, reserving ‘nationalist’ to 
describe other states’ similar policies, a tendency from which Russia provides no 
exception.  
 For the purposes of this analysis, I adopt a broad and non-normative definition 
that ‘nationalism is primarily a political principle that holds that the political and the 
national unit should be congruent’ (Gellner, 1983, p. 1). As such, nationalism argues 
for ‘the recognition of a people (nation) [narod (natsiia)] as the source of state power 
and the main agent [sub”ekt] of the political system’ (Verkhovskii and Pain, 2012, p. 
52; cf. Laine, 2017, p. 223). A nationalist policy asserts 1) that there exists a nation 
with an explicit character; 2) that the interests/values of this nation take priority over 
those of other nations; and 3) that the nation must be as independent/sovereign as 
possible (Breuilly, 1993, p. 2). Therefore, with a nationalist foreign policy, we would 
expect ideational tendencies reflecting these principles, in particular evidence of 
messianism, exclusionism or chauvinism, inasmuch as the interests of the core nation 
are seen as pre-eminent, not only in relation to domestic ethnic groups but foreign ones 
as well.   
Specifically concerning Russia, we might regard a nationalist foreign policy as 
one that aligns ideationally with the foreign policy preferences of nationalist groups, 
even if such groups’ direct influence on policy outcomes is indistinct. Russian 
nationalist groups are themselves so divided that it only makes sense to talk of Russian 
nationalisms in the plural. The principal division was traditionally between multi-ethnic 
imperialist ‘empire-savers’ and ethno-nationalist ‘nation-builders’ (Szporluk, 1989). 
However, with further subdivisions, the increasing salience of ethno-nationalism and 
the co-mingling of these ideal types, this division is now too simplistic (Kolstø, 2016a; 
Laruelle, 2017a). Broadly, however, such groups can be regarded as belonging to a 
‘hard-line nationalist’ camp who wish to defend (ethnic) Russian cultural norms, 
language and religion and insist on Russia’s national uniqueness and independence 
(Tsygankov, 2009). As outlined further below, many see Russia’s 2014 annexation of 
Crimea as an archetypal example of nationalist foreign policy, inasmuch as it was 
partially justified on the basis of defending ethnic Russians and reuniting the ethnic 
Russian nation allegedly divided by arbitrary borders.  
 Nationalism also needs to be conceptually distinguished from patriotism. For 
many, these are antithetical concepts: ‘good’ patriotism is counterposed to chauvinistic 
nationalism (Gries et al., 2011). However, for the purposes of this study, they should 
be seen as ontologically separate even if practically intertwined concepts. Patriotism 
entails individual feelings towards the community (e.g. pride in one’s country), whereas 
nationalism involves group feelings towards the state (primarily, the desire for the state 
to represent the nation) (Baker, 2012). So, patriotism need not be political, whereas 
nationalism is so by definition. The distinction is important in the Russian context, since 
the state’s ‘managed nationalism’ described below essentially attempts to defuse 
nationalism’s mobilisational potential in favour of a depoliticised patriotism that 
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reinforces acquiescence in the status quo.  
 
Approaches to nationalism and foreign policy: driver or driven?  
 
This section outlines the chief conceptual approaches to the role of nationalism in RFP, 
outlining their main strengths and weaknesses. Of course, any such categorisation is 
schematic and somewhat simplistic. Far from all analysts declare an overt theoretical 
position, nor is everyone consistent across their body of work. Many works approach 
nationalism from an area-studies rather than IR perspective, and thus address very 
specific aspects of the issue (e.g. the rise of hate crime, the role of skinhead groups, the 
ideology of the Russian Orthodox Church), without attempting to make many broader 
inferences about the regime, still less about foreign policy (e.g. Mitrofanova, 2012; 
Pilkington et al., 2013). However, the following presents a viable heuristic framework 
for understanding the main tenets of the most prevalent views.  
 
Realism and the non-importance of ideology 
 
Realist (or geopolitical) approaches are probably the most influential among scholars 
of RFP, but are also those that say least about nationalism. It is well known that classical 
realism’s main concern is with system-level factors, and there is little emphasis put 
either on considering domestic factors generally, or prising open the black box of 
foreign-policy making in particular (Pursiainen, 2000).   
Such approaches conceptualise state policy in terms of stable, rational national 
interests focussed on issues of ‘hard’ security, geopolitics and economic gain. 
Specifically, many regard Russian foreign policy as ‘based on classic realist notions of 
international politics in which states pursue their conception of national interests 
without fear of favour’ (Sakwa, 2016, p. 120). Such ‘classically realist’ geopolitical 
axioms include balance-of-power and spheres of influence, embedded in a Hobbesian 
mindset of a zero-sum conflict of all against all (e.g. Lo, 2003; Mankoff, 2009). Realist 
analyses have little truck with more subjective, values-based motivations, including 
ideational factors and national identity generally or nationalism specifically. ‘Russia 
Inc.’ is viewed as a pragmatic, cynical and non-ideological power, focussed on 
economic self-interest above all (Trenin, 2007).  
Central to realist views of RFP is long-term continuity. Churchill’s view that 
the key to the Soviet enigma is ‘national interest’ might equally apply to post-Soviet 
politics, irrespective of domestic fluctuations. Even Russia’s 2014 Crimea intervention, 
which to some is ‘nationalist’ foreign policy par excellence, is regarded as largely more 
of the same. According to Mearsheimer (2014, p. 81), it is ‘Geopolitics 101: great 
powers are always sensitive to potential threats near their home territory’; in this case 
threats posed by Western expansion via NATO to Sevastopol. Others have highlighted 
how the Ukrainian crisis indicates realist postulates need to be brought even more to 
the centre of analysis than hitherto (e.g. Kotkin, 2016). 
Realist approaches’ intuitive plausibility is reinforced by the evident utilisation 
of geopolitical guiding tenets in official RFP doctrine, which traditionally evince ‘very 
rational language and … formal strategies’ (Forsberg and Pursiainen, 2017, p. 12). An 
emphasis on pragmatism and sober rationality are also central to elite justifications of 
RFP, particularly during crisis periods. For example, following the 2008 Russo-
Georgian war, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated that the only ideology 
determining foreign policy was ‘common sense and the supremacy of international law’ 
(Lavrov, 2008).  
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However, realist approaches look far less robust under the microscope. In 
particular, they make the fundamental mistake of taking official discourse at face value, 
rather than investigating its role in regime legitimation and self-justification. After all, 
analysts weren’t confined to using Marxist-Leninist lenses to interpreting Soviet 
ideology; it was accepted that the degree to which Soviet conduct followed ideological 
postulates needed investigation, not a priori acceptance (Robinson, 1995). 
In particular, the idea that Russia has ‘permanent’ interests as a great power is 
a staple of contemporary state discourse. As Putin put it in his Millennium Manifesto, 
Russian great-powerness is ‘preconditioned by the inseparable characteristics of its 
geopolitical, economic and cultural existence. They determined the mentality of 
Russians and the policy of the government throughout the history of Russia and they 
cannot but do so at present’ (Putin, 1999). Striving to return to a supposedly deserved 
‘rightful’ status forms the crux of the contemporary foreign policy consensus 
(Lukyanov, 2016). However, such arguments are anachronistic, neatly homogenising 
history to further regime legitimacy. That the national interests of an ideological 
superpower (the USSR), the much smaller and weaker (geopolitically and 
economically) contemporary Russia and the Tsarist Empire can be reduced to 
fundamentally continuous great-powerness is more act of faith than serious analysis. 
 Certainly, several analysts hold that the Soviet system reflected nationalist 
elements alongside Communist principles, with particular resemblance to the policies 
of Nikolai I. According to Robert Tucker (1991, p. 29), the Leninist system was ‘a kind 
of neo-czarist order that called itself “socialist”’. For David Brandenburger (2010) the 
Stalin period in particular was marked by ‘Russocentric Etatism’, whereby Marxism-
Leninism was downgraded in favour of Russian historical themes. However, such 
continuity is much overstated. It is more accurate to see Russocentric geopolitics and 
Marxism-Leninism coexisting in what Vladislav Zubok (2009) calls the ‘revolutionary-
imperial paradigm.’ Recent research shows that Soviet leaders took ideology very 
seriously (Gould-Davies, 1999). Generally, neither geopolitical nor ideological 
components lent themselves to unthinking expansionism. Indeed, Soviet interventions 
in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan (especially the latter) were undertaken 
reluctantly and somewhat reactively after much Politburo debate (Zubok, 2009). 
Indeed, the 2014 annexation of Crimea appears much more precipitate in comparison 
and hardly shows a historical reflex.  
Moreover, whereas realism has broad-brush explanatory power, it cannot 
explain the detailed evolution of post-Soviet RFP. Certainly, identifying the common 
thread of a push-back against Western (especially NATO and EU) incursion into 
Russia’s sphere of influence broadly explains how Russia has subverted ‘coloured 
revolutions’ in its ‘near abroad’ and why it intervened directly in Georgia and Ukraine 
to reinforce ‘red lines’ preventing their movement Westwards. However, this does not 
explain exceptionality and inconsistency, e.g. why Putin acquiesced in NATO 
expansion in the early 2000s, why Russia intervened militarily in Ukraine in 2014 but 
not in 2004-5, or why Russia actively helped oust Kurmanbek Bakiev in Kyrgyzstan in 
2010 (Götz, 2016). Most strikingly, realism fails to account for why the West is 
construed as an existential threat, when both NATO and the EU are divided, often weak 
and decreasingly expansionist, with, in particular, NATO enlargement to Ukraine 
barely realistic after 2008 (Macfarlane, 2016). In contrast, the rise of China, especially 
its encroachment to Russia’s south and east, and its rising economic and military power, 
which ought certainly to figure highly in any ‘objective’ list of Russia’s security threats, 
has not been securitised in Russian discourse (Kaczmarski, 2012). 
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Overall, many realist accounts still take insufficient account of subjective 
domestic motivations. Official regime discourse is accepted at face value, and is 
assumed to be constant and not fundamentally domestically contested. Most curiously, 
given his status as one of the foremost analysts of Russian politics, Richard Sakwa’s 
Frontline Ukraine (2015) lacks substantive focus on Russian domestic politics. This 
account’s coverage of nationalism is limited to ‘monist’ Ukrainian nationalism, whose 
virulence is allegedly deleterious to Ukraine’s Russian-speakers, as argued by Russia’s 
official discourse.  
Certainly, some more nuanced realist accounts do acknowledge the role of 
domestic constituencies. In particular, neo-classical realism accords a role for regime 
factors as intervening variables in translating external, geopolitical incentives into 
domestic politics (Charap and Welt, 2015; Simão, 2012). This is potentially a useful 
prism for examining how nationalist politicians and interest groups intervene in foreign 
policy making in response to external factors (Laruelle, 2015). 
However, even neo-classical realism gives insufficient credence to the role of 
domestic factors in interpreting and shaping, as well as being shaped by, external 
pressures. For instance an otherwise sophisticated account inspired by neo-classical 
realism argues that Vladimir Putin is little more than a ‘“transmitter” responsible for 
translating geopolitical imperatives into foreign-policy behavior’ (Götz, 2016, p. 17). 
This view clashes diametrically with most scholarly approaches to Russian domestic 
politics who argue that Putin’s role is absolutely pivotal. As regards nationalism, 
Laruelle (2015, p. 88) sees it more as a post-hoc explanation for foreign policy 
discourse than a direct driver of the RFP agenda (see further below). Whereas this has 
a strong kernel of truth, it downplays the extent to which nationalist ideas may inform 
mainstream discourse and thereby reflexively affect policy making in a more diffuse 
and long-term way.  
 
Constructivism and the centrality of identity 
 
In contrast to realist accounts, constructivist approaches do put ideational factors, 
including values, identity and status, far more to the fore (e.g. Clunan, 2009; 
Tsygankov, 2010). They highlight how ‘national interests’ are themselves subjective, 
contested, emotional and strongly ideational. A vital claim is that national identity 
debates are central; in particular, the West is the significant Other in interlocution with 
which Russian identity is constructed. Aspirations towards Western recognition of 
Russia’s Great Power status, and of associated national values, especially sovereignty, 
are constants in Russia’s relationship with the West and explain the fluctuating and 
frictional nature of this interaction. This also helps explain how China, whose role in 
Russian identity construction is minimal and largely uncontested, its not construed as a 
security threat. So for constructivists, security threats, and national interests in toto, are 
‘what states make of them’.  
 Many constructivists do not dwell on nationalism explicitly. However, their 
emphasis on ideational factors indicates significant potential overlap with the topic at 
hand. For instance, authors have highlighted how Russian assertiveness has been 
underpinned by a new focus on ‘soft power’ from c. 2007 onwards, which seeks to 
promote Russia as a ‘value centre’ (Feklyunina, 2016; Monaghan, 2008a). Among such 
values, Russian culture and language, and the notion of Russkii mir (Russian World) 
have taken increasingly prominent roles. In this way, RFP has taken an increasingly 
‘civilisational turn’ since the late 2000s, whereby its formerly realist Weltanschauung 
has been increasingly infused with ideas of Russian exceptionalism, informed by a 
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focus on Russian linguistic, cultural and spiritual uniqueness (Tsygankov, 2016). 
Arguably, this made assertive defence of Russian speakers in Ukraine unavoidable 
(Zevelev, 2014). 
 Furthermore, several constructivist authors do accord prominence to nationalist 
discourses. In particular, there are three generally accepted foreign policy tendencies, 
whose interaction drives foreign policy articulation: the liberals/Westernisers, 
statists/pragmatic nationalists and the aforementioned hard-line 
nationalists/civilisationalists (Tsygankov, 2009). This latter camp is represented among 
most parliamentary political parties (especially the Liberal Democrats [LDPR] and 
Communists [KPRF]) as well as among the non-party elite. For most of the Putin era 
the statists (among which he is counted) were the most influential group and the 
nationalists the least (Zevelev, 2014). Despite giving them occasional rhetorical 
concessions, the authorities have generally regarded nationalist policies as 
geopolitically confrontational and economically counterproductive (Tsygankov, 2009). 
However, the rise of the civilisationalist discourse may show changes afoot. In 
particular, the statists’ emphasis on anti-Western ressentiment (the sense of envy that 
reinforces particularistic pride and xenophobia as parts of national identity) indicates 
that the statists are closer to the nationalists than often assumed (Smith, 2012). The 
Putin circle has developed a visceral anti-Western conspirology (Zygarʹ, 2016). Such 
proclivities allow nationalist ideas (usually, but not exclusively, pragmatic ones) to act 
as ‘conceptual “road maps”’ steering foreign policy (Jackson, 2003, p. 173). 
 Accordingly, the main relevance of constructivist approaches is in prioritising 
the role of identity debates in RFP, which are focussed predominantly on Russia’s 
relationship with the West, and in seeing nationalists as active participants in them. 
However, whereas unlike realism, constructivism does explicitly focus on the 
domestic/foreign policy interaction, it also suffers from a macro-level approach that 
helps identify general trends but is often insufficiently fine-grained to understand the 
twists and turns of foreign policy making. For example, the focus on Europe as Russia’s 
Other potentially obfuscates the many convolutions of Kremlin policy, from the explicit 
pro-Europeanism of Putin’s early years, partially recaptured in the Medvedev 
interregnum, to the increasing emphasis on Russian exceptionalism and non-European 
essence in Putin’s fourth term. Arguably, the discursive focus obscures more accurate 
and nuanced attention towards domestic policy shifts. For instance, Laruelle (2015) 
argues that there is no nationalist ‘school’ in Russian politics with direct impact on 
foreign policy. The ‘hard-line nationalist’ camp is thus more a heuristic ideal type than 
an accurate depiction of policy influence.  
 
The normativity of liberalism 
 
‘Liberal’ approaches do not necessarily correspond to ‘neoliberal institutionalist’ IR 
theories (focussing on international co-operation), and they rarely display as cohesive 
a theoretical position as the two aforementioned approaches (indeed their epistemology 
is often implicit). However, this group encompasses those influenced by 
democratisation/transition theories, which critique Russia for its increasing 
authoritarianism (Shevtsova, 2014; Stoner and McFaul, 2015). Such viewpoints focus 
more explicitly on domestic politics than the previous two, and bring the role of 
nationalism therein much more to the fore. That said, the implications of the liberal 
stance are more problematic, inasmuch as there is a normative focus that leads to 
potential inaccuracy and exaggeration. 
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 As regards domestic policy, liberals see nationalism as playing a core role. They 
generally regard it as on the rise, since it is associated with a general trend towards 
increasing elite repression and/or manipulation of the political space. Specifically, the 
elite uses and abuses nationalism to mobilise regime support by creating an image of 
national crisis and external enemies, a ‘besieged fortress’ that creates a ‘rally round the 
flag effect’, mobilising disparate constituencies around the national leadership in a 
quasi-war footing, and simultaneously delegitimising the domestic opposition as 
unpatriotic quislings (Shevtsova, 2015a). Indeed, the Putin-era Kremlin has 
periodically attacked its domestic opponents as ‘unpatriotic’ fifth-columnists, a 
tendency particularly marked in the immediate aftermath of the 2014 Crimea 
annexation. 
 Furthermore, the Kremlin’s active propagation of nationalist actors has helped 
move nationalism from the Yeltsin-era political margins to the Putin-era mainstream. 
Most notorious are the nationalist/imperialist ideologues and ‘shock jocks’ who have 
increasing visibility as regime cheerleaders and/or ideologues. Most column inches 
have been devoted to the propagandist Aleksandr Dugin, the progenitor of modern neo-
Eurasianism (e.g. Umland, 2007). Some have gone as far as to attribute him direct 
policy influence as ‘Putin’s brain’ (Barbashin and Thoburn, 2014). Many assert that 
Eurasianism underpins an allegedly increasingly concrete new regime ideology 
(Clover, 2016; Laqueur, 2015). At the same time, the Kremlin has actively encouraged 
quasi-nationalistic GONGOs such as Nashi and Molodaya gvardiya, and has developed 
often ambiguous relations with a range of other, more hard-line groups such as Russkii 
obraz.  
 A cardinal example of the apparently inexorable rise of nationalism has been 
Putin’s so-called ‘conservative turn’ after 2012. The regime increasingly distinguished 
itself from Western liberalism by emphasising ‘biopolitical conservatism’, i.e. 
‘traditional values’ such as spirituality, the nuclear family and patriotism (Makarychev 
and Yatsyk, 2014). This had a domestic dimension (e.g. new legislation against 
blasphemy, ‘gay propaganda’, and increased restrictions on the extra-parliamentary 
opposition) but also a more marked foreign policy dimension, with the securitisation of 
identity and civilizational values (Zevelev, 2016). A common view, albeit one that 
ignores a lot of continuities, was that ‘Russia’s foreign policy ha[d] undergone a 
“paradigm shift” from state-driven foreign policy to one driven by ethno-nationalist 
ideas’ (Tsygankov, 2015, pp. 279–280). 
 The conservative turn had a plausible domestic rationale, i.e. Putin’s weakening 
support after the 2011-2 electoral protests, particularly among more educated, urban 
strata, necessitated reinforcing his support among more traditionalist rural and small-
town electorates, and administratively and discursively marginalising the liberal 
opposition as unpatriotic degenerates, a campaign most visible in the victimisation of 
the ‘Pussy Riot’ collective in 2012.  
 Liberal views (e.g. Shevtsova, 2015b; Treisman, 2014) see the Crimean 
escapade as an extension of these domestic tactics: the use of a ‘short, victorious war’ 
as a diversionary tactic to boost Putin’s flailing popularity. As with the Georgian war 
in 2008, Putin’s poll-ratings hit stratospheric heights in the aftermath of an intervention 
that reinforced Russia assertiveness and its return as a Great Power to be reckoned with. 
 Such views are clearly right to focus on nationalism’s utility for regime 
legitimacy. There is a long tradition of the Russian state utilising nationalist themes and 
groups for societal consolidation. In the Tsarist era, Official Nationality, Uvarov’s 
Triad of Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality, was intended to challenge the appeal 
of revolutionary liberalism (Riasanovsky, 1959), while at the turn of the 20th century, 
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the regime actively fostered nationalist groups to intimidate anti-regime challengers 
(Laqueur, 1994). In the Brezhnev era, regime conservatives tolerated and protected 
nationalist figures in order to buttress the Party’s declining Marxist-Leninist legitimacy 
(Mitrokhin, 2003), while in the Gorbachev period, Kremlin conservatives were again 
the protégés of a new generation of Russophile groups (Dunlop, 1993).  
 However, such accounts generally over-emphasise these links, assuming that 
they are rising inexorably. In contrast, the Medvedev interregnum coincided with the 
mothballing of the Nashi group, while Western analysts paid more attention to Dugin’s 
apparent rise than they did to his 2014 dismissal as head of the Sociology Department 
at Moscow State University. Nor did they note the rehabilitation of ‘liberal’ figures 
(e.g. Kudrin and Kirienko) to the Kremlin after 2015 (Laruelle 2017). Moreover, they 
exaggerate the utility of regime-sponsored nationalism. There are significant doubts as 
to whether regime legitimacy in 2012-3 was so weak as to necessitate a risky 
diversionary manoeuvre. The impact of the 2011-2 protests is contestable and in any 
case, by early 2014, Putin had silenced the domestic opposition (Tsygankov, 2015). 
 Liberal views are strongest when they concentrate in detail on domestic regime 
functions without over-reliance on transitological frameworks. For example, several 
works use the term ‘managed nationalism’ to highlight how Kremlin policy and 
nationalist groups inter-relate (Horvath, 2014; Laine, 2015). This concept focuses on 
how the Kremlin’s use of nationalism is profoundly instrumental, and nationalism can 
be encouraged as well as actively oppressed, whenever it suits regime goals. 
Among the most productive accounts are those that reject the realist view of the 
state as unified actor and probe the ways in which nationalism maps onto Russia’s 
complex informal elite networks. For Kimberley Marten (2015), Russian policy-
making is opaque, contradictory, shambolic and often self-defeating by nature, which 
is explained by the contestation of self-interested regime networks who have no 
strategic view in mind, let alone a united conception of ‘national interests’ Where 
nationalism fits in is that ‘assertive’ nationalism is usually bluster designed to signify 
strength for disciplining domestic networks. However, regime networks’ self-interest 
results in risk-aversion beneath the bluster. For Marten (2015, p. 83), Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea was only possible since it was a ‘low-risk’ endeavour, given ‘its 
overwhelming ethnic Russian majority, its long history as a Russian imperial subject, 
and its rather arbitrary re-designation from a Russian to Ukrainian Soviet territory under 
Nikita Khrushchev’.  
A similar, but more developed, view is offered by Henry Hale (2016). He 
broadens the regime’s use of nationalism from simply expediency or legitimacy to a 
fundamental question of elite survival – the function of patronal presidents (i.e. those 
whose core role is as patrons of rent-seeking networks). From this perspective, whereas 
previously Putin had relied sparingly on domestic nationalism because it was politically 
risky, his ‘conservative turn’ raised its prominence. It thereby solved a fundamental 
problem of regime stability after 2011, by delegitimising liberal constituencies, by 
giving Putin’s third term a revived political narrative, and by consolidating elites 
around the president. Similarly, Neil Robinson (2017, p. 360) highlights how the 
‘conservative turn’ provided an answer to the regime’s long-term modernisation 
dilemmas, by attempting to shift ‘the ground of what counted as success in state 
building from issues of functionality towards vague and indeterminate goals based on 
a cultural rather than an administrative conception of the state’. These perspectives help 
understand Russia’s involvement in Ukraine, which, according to Hale (2016, p. 247) 
hit the ‘sweet spot’ of Russian nationalism: ‘enhancing Russia’s purity from the 
perspective of narrowly ethnic Russian nationalists while also restoring Moscow’s 
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control over more lands of the former USSR’. Thus it consolidated multiple elite 
groups, public opinion and opposition nationalist groups round the regime. 
 Liberal approaches often also emphasise the international spill-over of domestic 
politics. By inverting Kantian democratic peace theory, they argue that increasing 
domestic authoritarianism/nationalism engenders aggressive/assertive foreign policy. 
Allegedly, Russia is offering a coherent ideology to challenge Western liberal-
democratic values. Nationalism is seen as intrinsically linked to this ideology. As 
Edward Lucas has argued (2009, p. 14), the ‘ideological conflict of the New Cold War 
is between lawless Russian nationalism and law-governed Western multilateralism.’ 
Such views highlight the role of anti-Western ideologues and the alleged prominence 
of Eurasianism to indicate that the regime’s foreign policy views are increasingly 
motivated by anti-Western nationalism (Clover, 2016; Laqueur, 2015). Similarly, the 
rise of the GONGOs is associated with a demonstrable ‘preventive counter-revolution’ 
against Western liberalism as encouraged by the early 2000s Colour Revolutions in 
Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan (Horvath, 2012). After the Crimean intervention, it 
appears that domestic and foreign policy discourses have become fused around a 
nationalist core (e.g. Galeotti and Bowen, 2014). Symptomatic in this regard has been 
Russia’s indirect support for nationalist groups in the Donbas, as well as often less 
concrete encouragement for a panoply of right-wing populist groups in Europe, chiefly 
Marine Le Pen’s Front National (Pomerantsev, 2015). Such examples would most 
clearly show domestic nationalism underpinning Russian malfeasance, not just in the 
post-Soviet space but across the EU more widely.     
These approaches rightly highlight the increased visibility of nationalist figures 
and themes in Russia’s foreign as well as domestic policy. Furthermore, there are strong 
theoretical arguments for positing a link between illiberalism and nationalism. 
Arguably, illiberal nationalism is inherent to authoritarian or semi- authoritarian 
systems, which lack the representative institutions and cultures of compromise that 
might digest nationalism into milder forms. As Michael Mann argues (1995, p. 62), 
‘[m]ild nationalism […] is democracy achieved, aggressive nationalism is democracy 
perverted’. There is no a priori reason to think that such ‘aggressive’ nationalism 
wouldn’t affect foreign policy. 
However, liberal approaches often fail to provide a nuanced investigation of 
links between domestic and foreign policy. Implicitly, a direct relationship is often 
assumed (i.e. that foreign policy simply reflects domestic). To that end, the role of 
nationalist thinkers is often de-contextualised, with the visibility and declared influence 
of nationalists taken at face value. This leads to truisms that are seldom questioned, e.g. 
Aleksandr Prokhanov being ‘Nightingale of the General Staff’, or Aleksandr Dugin’s 
being an influential ‘Kremlin advisor’. In reality, such figures do not advise the Kremlin 
directly, and their influence is much more diffuse. It remains an open question as to 
whether Kremlin links with foreign ‘nationalists’ are driven by ideological or pragmatic 
motivations (Shekhovtsov, 2015).  
Often, liberal approaches attribute nationalism a barely-warranted causative 
power. They tend to see it as a largely homogeneous, undifferentiated ideology. 
Implicitly or otherwise, they view it as characterised by an unchanging primordial anti-
Westernism, whereas more constructivist approaches would emphasise that mutability, 
contestation and division are far more characteristic to it. Similarly, liberal approaches 
can use some highly normative terms with little attempt at accurate definition. For 
example, van Herpen (2015) regards the party of power ‘United Russia’ and the various 
pro-Kremlin GONGOs as examples of ‘chauvinist ultranationalism’. An extreme 
example is Kuzio (2017), in whose work nationalism is a catch-all term for all kinds of 
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nefarious behaviour: not just foreign policy aggression but extra-judicial murder, 
corruption etc.   
Overall, liberal approaches’ value is in bringing domestic regime type and 
motivations to the fore, in particular, highlighting the regime’s use of nationalist forces 
in power consolidation. These approaches are stronger in analysis of domestic than 
foreign politics. In the former, they identify the functionality of nationalism for regime 
electoral and legitimacy purposes. In the latter, they highlight the increasing role of 
nationalist intellectuals and ideas as potentially underpinning more assertive foreign 
policy agendas. However, in both cases, the liberal approach can be simplistic and 
selective, highlighting examples of nationalist influence outside broader policy-making 
contexts, and seeing nationalism as a reflexively anti-Western phenomenon.    
The main strengths and weaknesses of all the above perspectives are 
summarised in Table 1. Clearly, they all have some validity. Realist approaches 
highlight the interest-based discourses that dominate Russian foreign policy, among 
which nationalism, at least until the ‘conservative turn’, has played a minor role; 
constructivist approaches show how Russian ‘national interests’ are subjectively 
constructed and domestically contested; nationalist ideas have played significant roles 
in such contestation and appear to be gaining traction; liberal approaches show how the 
‘rise’ of nationalism is related to increasing illiberalism in domestic and foreign policy 
(albeit they exaggerate its role). What is largely lacking however, are more holistic 
approaches that acknowledge both the contested and diverse nature of Russian 
nationalisms and which seek explicitly to address their interaction with the multi-level 
nature of Russian policy-making. The next section focuses on two such approaches and 
how they might be developed further. 
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Table 1. The main approaches to explaining nationalism and RFP 
 
 Main explanations  Main strengths and weaknesses  
Realist explanations RFP motivated by material capabilities and 
global/regional balance of power; little role 
for ideologies generally and nationalism 
specifically 
Strengths: identifies main themes of Russian doctrine and official 
discourse; explains RFP ‘red lines’ towards NATO 
 Western threats to Russian sphere of 
influence (NATO, Coloured Revolutions, 
EU)  
Weaknesses:  uncritical approach; no explanation for growing 
ideational factors; absence of threat-perception towards China  
Constructivist 
explanations 
Focus on domestic contestation of RFP, in 
which Russian nationalists play a key but 
subordinate role  
Strengths: explains Russian focus on West as Other; brings 
ideational factors to the fore; explains growing focus on civilization 
and soft power; explains domestic contention 
 RFP motivated by search for Great Power 
recognition, status, prestige and honour 
Weaknesses: generic approach that does not sufficiently explain link 
between discourse and policy; sees nationalists as undifferentiated 
whole 
Liberal explanations  RFP has domestic sources; rise of 
nationalism explained by regime’s 
authoritarianism and attempt to divert 
attention from domestic policy failures 
Strengths: focus on regime utilization of nationalism for 
legitimacy/expediency; explains ‘conservative turn’ 
 Nationalism linked to foreign policy 
assertion. Russia seeks both to prevent 
democratic contagion in its immediate 
neighbourhood and challenge Western 
liberalism more broadly 
Weaknesses: normative approach that exaggerates unity and strength 
of nationalism; exaggerates and reifies nationalism as eternally 
rising; subjective view of policy failure 
 
Source: author, inspired by Götz (2016).  
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Towards a holistic model of nationalism and RFP  
 
There have been several recent works linking the study of nationalism to regime 
dynamics in a more detailed and holistic fashion. Kolstø and Blakkisrud (2016) focus 
on the role of nationalist groups and national identity, while Cadier and Light (2015) 
address domestic and foreign policy in the aftermath of the conservative turn. These are 
detailed and theoretically eclectic edited volumes (albeit drawing most on liberalism 
and constructivism, and in Cadier and Light’s case the Foreign Policy Analysis 
tradition). Both see nationalism as on the rise and (particularly the latter) conclude both 
that foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy, and that nationalism plays a great 
role within the latter. However, only two approaches explicitly aim to provide a 
multilevel conceptual model for Russian nationalism’s policy-making role, Luke 
March (2012a, 2012b) and Marlène Laruelle (2017a). The ensuing analysis will outline 
how these complementary works can provide a road-map for future research.    
Like several aforementioned accounts, March sees Kremlin’s overall approach 
as ‘managed nationalism’. He further argues that managed nationalism is consistent 
with the Kremlin’s general approach to civil society, sometimes described as ‘managed 
pluralism’ (Balzer 2003). This is the way in which the regime sets the agenda for 
‘healthy’ socio-political competition and stigmatises those outside this agenda. 
Managed nationalism permits nationalism that does not fundamentally challenge the 
authoritarian state, which gives an inbuilt advantage to illiberal and even extremist 
forms, but is generally inimical to any liberal nationalism that critiques the state. This 
managed nationalism consists of three interlocking spheres (March, 2012a): 
 
1. Official nationality is named because it is functionally equivalent to Tsarist 
Official Nationality in terms of being only quasi-nationalist (state interests are 
prior to the nation’s) and in its broader aim of co-opting patriotic sentiment in 
the interests of preserving internal and external regime stability against foreign 
threats. It is contained in official Kremlin statements, such as presidential 
addresses and foreign policy doctrines that articulate the gosudarstvennik 
(statist) position. This is a relatively moderate, pro-European, secular and 
pragmatic conservatism most cogently articulated in the doctrine of ‘sovereign 
democracy’. 
2. Cultural nationalism is principally the mainstream intellectual and media 
discourse and symbols that aim to reinforce the historical, moral and social 
aspects of a distinct Russian ‘national’ way of life and thereby build a sense of 
national solidarity. 
3. Political nationalism is simply domestic electoral and social mobilization 
around nationalist motifs. 
 
The regime actively shapes the relationship among these three spheres: official 
nationality sets down the parameters for the cultural and political sphere that are 
allowed some autonomy within (and occasionally, beyond) these limits as long as they 
do not fundamentally challenge it. Furthermore, managed nationalism has a long 
historical tradition and echoes the way the Kremlin over the ages has periodically used 
nationalist sentiment while trying to remain autonomous from it. Kremlin policy is very 
rarely nationalist per se (cf. Tuminez, 2000).  
This is a paradoxical process; the Kremlin sometimes encourages nationalism, but 
sometimes has to rein nationalist forces in, often with oppressive methods. Increasingly 
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during the Putin regime, the need to encourage nationalism in the cultural and political 
realm has conflicted with the Kremlin’s officially restrained policy, risking creating a 
self-sustaining momentum to which the Kremlin has to respond. 
Supporting some constructivist views of a ‘civilizational turn’, we can see that, 
even prior to the more recent ‘conservative turn’, a dominant theme of both cultural 
and political nationalism had become ‘civilisational nationalism’, which emphasises 
the uniqueness of Russian ‘civilisation’ and contrasts it against the Western ‘Other’ 
(especially pro-Western governments in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova) (Shnirel’man, 
2007). This civilisational nationalism often directly contradicts the pro-European, 
modernist and pragmatic elements of official nationality. This tendency also gives 
support to the liberal view of the regime’s domestic legitimacy as relying on a ‘besieged 
fortress’ paradigm. 
 The ‘rise’ of nationalism can be explained partly as a legitimating device against 
perceived external threats (e.g. Coloured Revolutions) and domestic policy problems 
(the focus on external enemies makes a convenient distraction). As Laruelle argues 
(2015), state-created nationalism is mainly used instrumentally as a post-hoc policy 
justification. But March’s approach also emphasises that nationalism is dialectical. The 
Kremlin is a keen observer (as well as manipulator) of public opinion (Zygarʹ, 2016, p. 
239). Given state control of the electronic media, a vicious circle of ‘civilisational 
nationalism’ is created. The state allows such nationalism to dominate the public space. 
Undoubtedly, this must re-inform Kremlin policy by creating a demand that it then has 
to respond to. 
 Indeed, March (2012b) shows how the ‘mission creep’ of civilizational 
nationalism grew before and after Russia’s intervention in Georgia in 2008. Hard-line 
nationalists were the dominant cheerleaders for assertive solutions before and during 
the conflict. Moreover, Aleksandr Dugin reputedly trained South Ossetian militias in 
the run-up (Spiegel Online, 2008). Regime and nationalist policies coincided, albeit 
briefly (e.g. the October–November 2006 campaign against Georgians was ‘the first 
incident of officially endorsed ethnic discrimination in contemporary Russia’ 
(Kozhevnikova, 2007)). Furthermore, regime and nationalist discourses (e.g. the 
assertion of Georgian intervention in South Ossetia as ‘genocide) were briefly 
symbiotic. The war gained Putin and Medvedev their then-highest public approval 
ratings and briefly endowed Medvedev with the nationalists’ seal of approval. 
Moreover, this period had long-term effects, with civilizational nationalism appearing 
in the 2008 foreign policy concept for the first time, with the declaration that global 
politics were taking on a ‘civilisational dimension’. However, the ‘Five-Day War’ also 
showed the paradoxicality of state-sponsored nationalism. The Kremlin was aware of 
nationalism escaping state control and President Medvedev warned about the dangers 
of domestic extremism even during the conflict. An incipient crackdown on domestic 
nationalist groups intensified until Putin’s return in 2012 and until then the Kremlin, its 
increased emphasis on soft power and Russkii mir notwithstanding, tried to reassert the 
golden rule of a pragmatic, interest-based foreign policy that indicated a continued 
hesitancy about prioritising ideational factors abroad.   
The main strengths of March’s approach are that it links nationalism clearly to 
regime dynamics. In this case, factors include a long-term campaign of ‘othering’ 
Georgians, ad hoc policy improvisation as well as Medvedev’s weak domestic 
legitimacy (Monaghan, 2008b). It further helps explain evident contradictions in state 
policy (i.e. attempts to utilise and repress Russian nationalism simultaneously). 
Moreover, such a multilevel approach can draw to different degrees on the 
aforementioned theoretical approaches, which at a macro-level appear mutually 
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contradictory. For example, it shows the essential validity of realist approaches in 
explaining the formal elements of RFP (especially the focus on NATO expansion as a 
threat, a more plausible motivation in the Georgian intervention than in the Crimean 
annexation). However, it makes clear that the realist approach does not explain 
domestic contestation over identity issues, which is better approached via a 
constructivist lens. As liberal approaches argue, March indicates how the regime has 
an interest in manipulating nationalism. However, contrary to these accounts, it shows 
that when nationalism directly impacts RFP, this occurs in a much more exceptional 
and limited fashion. 
March’s approach does have weaknesses. Although it can map the interaction 
between nationalism and domestic and foreign policy in some detail, it remains 
somewhat broad-brush. This is an inevitable corollary of the opacity of the Russian 
foreign policy process, but the approach is also predominantly discursive. It can explain 
temporal shifts in regime rhetoric and thereby show potential congruence between 
nationalist and regime ideas. However, it cannot show causation, and whether 
nationalist ideas directly impact specific foreign policy decisions. 
Laruelle (2017) argues that more precise analysis needs to focus less on ideas 
and ideologues than the policy locus of nationalists; both in terms of interaction with 
elite groups and in more specific legislative outcomes. In doing so, she argues that the 
role of nationalists is much more constrained than often understood. They are just one 
of several interest groups, and not a unified one at that. The Kremlin generally keeps a 
distance from them, and utilises their ideas as one of several ‘doctrinal products’ on the 
‘ideological market’ (Laruelle, 2017b). There is definitely evidence of increasing 
interaction with nationalists in the emergence of conservative ideology, although not 
all of this can accurately be regarded as nationalist. However, Laruelle (2015) identifies 
only limited evidence of direct, consistent nationalist impact on RFP (policy towards 
compatriots) .  
Laruelle (2017a) further identifies three main strata promoting a nationalist 
agenda. These are 1) nonstate actors (unregistered parties, social movements and social 
media/internet networks), including the National Bolsheviks, skinhead groups and the 
‘national democrats’ (Aleksei Naval’nyi et al.), who want the Russian nation to rise up 
against the Putin regime; these groups are anti-system, but may have regime patrons; 
2) parastate actors, who ‘operate under the state umbrella, in the gray zone of the 
Kremlin’s “ecosystem” of interest groups, lobbies, and personal connections’ (2017a, 
p. 90). Such groups have their own interests and ideologies, and include the main Duma 
parties, the Russian Orthodox Church, Orthodox businessmen (e.g. Vladimir Yakunin 
and Konstantin Malofeev), as well as different governmental branches and the military 
industrial complex; 3) finally, there are state actors, primarily the President and 
Presidential Administration. Laruelle argues that this focus on groups and strategies 
allows a comprehensive assessment of the mobilisational potential of Russian 
nationalism. This approach is not unproblematic (e.g. the ‘parastatal’ groups, 
particularly the MIC, might be considered elements of the state). However, it does focus 
on the essential pluralism of Russian nationalism, its contested nature, and its different 
roles at multiple levels. Laruelle’s argument is that nationalism is growing at grassroots 
level and receives increasing sympathy from some parastatal groups, but is so far 
limited by state co-optation and the antipathy of most groups to grassroots anti-regime 
ethnonationalism. 
 While Laruelle’s approach does not directly engage with March’s and has a 
different focus (more policy-oriented, but without explicitly mentioning RFP), it is 
largely complementary to it. This is especially so in its analysis of official nationality 
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(what Laruelle calls ‘state nationalism’), which like March, Laruelle regards as 
inclusive, instrumental and ‘an eclectic piece of bricolage’ (2017a, p. 96). This state 
nationalism posits the state as ‘the symbol, embodiment, and quintessence of the nation’ 
(p. 95) and draws on a range of ideologies, not just nationalism. It is a flexible mélange 
of ideas that ‘guarantees stability in exchange for political loyalty and deference; and 
… embodies historical continuity in the face of regime changes and collapses’ (p. 95). 
As such, it again recalls Tsarist Official Nationality. Convincingly, Laruelle argues that 
a state master-narrative is not unique to Russia. What is more noteworthy is ‘that the 
nation’s master narrative is intimately articulated and instrumentalized by the regime 
to secure its legitimacy and to marginalize opponents, real or imagined’ (p. 95). 
Contrary to liberal accounts, this is not ‘an inherent and essentialist Russian nationalism 
… but the state’s use of the national grand narrative it produces in domestic political 
struggle is a critical characteristic of the regime’ (Ibid.). Laruelle’s approach is also 
clearly compatible with regime network accounts, inasmuch as it argues for pluralist 
and conflictual regime interests. 
 Using March and Laruelle’s accounts as bases, and drawing on the 
aforementioned theoretical approaches, we can outline a plausible model for how 
nationalism affects RFP that could form the basis for further research. This model is 
outlined in Figure 1, and then briefly outlined. 
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Figure 1.  A model for understanding the interaction between nationalism and RFP 
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This model has a constructivist underpinning, evidenced in the number of bidirectional 
arrows showing a reflexive relationship between, for example, public opinion and state 
discourses and the central importance of the latter. More specifically, although 
international geopolitical factors are of vital importance (top left box), unlike in a 
similar model by Götz (2016) which has a neo-classical realist framework, they do not 
have causative effect, reflecting the constructivist view that there are no ‘objective’ 
national interests independent of domestic contestation. The changing global/regional 
balance-of-power, and in particular the increasing prominence of Western influence in 
the ‘near abroad’ via NATO/EU expansion and the Coloured Revolutions have become 
vital to the regime’s threat perceptions. But these threats are mediated both by public 
opinion (bottom left box) and crucially by the Kremlin (top right). Their salience has 
changed over time. For instance, of particular importance appear to be Putin’s feelings 
of personal betrayal at a whole range of Western policies (especially regime change in 
Iraq and Syria and Western support for Russia’s opposition), as well as a shared Russian 
elite perception that Coloured Revolutions were engineered by Western security 
services rather than social change (Zygarʹ, 2016).  
 The second column represents the mechanisms of ‘managed nationalism’ as 
outlined by March, i.e. a range of interlocking discourses under the direct control of the 
state that seek to police public discourse over national values and to actively mould 
public opinion. As aforementioned, official nationality provides the parameters for 
cultural and political nationalism, although there is also a feedback loop from these to 
the official doctrine (e.g. the spillover of civilizational nationalism into official 
nationality and thence foreign policy). However, whereas the upwards arrow from 
official nationality indicates that this stands at the nexus between domestic and foreign 
policy, so nationalist discourse can thereby directly affect (and be affected by) RFP, 
this model does not assume that this is the main driver of RFP. The Kremlin retains 
direct and independent control over both official nationality and RFP. This reflects that 
a) the Kremlin can usually limit any spillover of more grassroots nationalism into 
official nationality and ‘turn off the tap’ where necessary and that b) many other 
Kremlin proclivities (doctrinal and personal) go directly into RFP, including personal 
pique and ad hoc improvisation. 
 The third column represents the regime groups outlined by Laruelle, and shows 
their input into nationalist discourse and policy making. Once again, the model is top-
down, with policy-making centred on the Kremlin. However, in common with regime 
network models, the ‘presidential vertical’ is made of divergent and competing groups. 
Again, the Kremlin sets down the general parameters, but they have certain autonomy 
in interceding in public discourse. I have divided Laruelle’s ‘parastatal’ groups into 
state affiliates and political groups. The former are opinion formers (such as the ROC, 
media and the MIC), whose influence will be predominantly in the sphere of cultural 
nationalism. The latter include Duma political parties and government ministers, who 
also intercede into cultural nationalism. However, since they actively link their view of 
nationalism with their political campaigns, they are also part of the political nationalism 
realm. Non-state actors generally have little or no access to state media and are 
generally excluded from official license to influence public debates over nationality or 
other issues, and are therefore influential in the political nationalism discourse only. 
 Public opinion plays an important role in this model. The public can assess 
geopolitical factors directly (e.g. via the internet and social media), but clearly in 
Russia’s media environment, will be receptive to managed nationalism as it is promoted 
via the dominant pro-Kremlin (especially electronic) media. The model shows how the 
different elements of the regime are influenced by public opinion, particularly to the 
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degree that it reflects assessments of the regime’s political and economic performance. 
How they respond to such information cannot be predicted, but, consistent with the 
liberal model, negative public assessments of regime performance provide an incentive 
to accentuate the importance of nationalism both in the domestic and foreign policy 
sphere.  
 Summing up, the above model provides a flexible, multilevel schema for 
understanding how nationalist discourses and regime interests interact. It highlights the 
important but variable role of nationalism in domestic discourse, and shows how it is a 
vital but far from decisive element in foreign policy. It is necessarily not conclusive but 
should provide a useful framework for future studies.  
 
Towards testable hypotheses? 
 
Nationalism’s dialectical and discursive nature makes it difficult to subject rigorously 
to the discipline of hypotheses. Nevertheless, detailed analysis of how it interacts with 
the regime and policy-making realm along the lines of the above model could be 
instructive in illustrating the following propositions:  
1) Nationalism is a socially constructed phenonomenon, not a primordial entity. 
Therefore the role of nationalism in Russian foreign policy is not constant, nor 
doomed to rise inexorably.  
2) (A linked issue) nationalism is not unitary: it is contested and multi-level. 
Consequently, official nationality is demonstrably different from the view-
points of leading nationalist ideologues, but is itself the product of contestation 
between regime networks. 
3) The oft-quoted leading nationalist ideologues are just one of several loose 
foreign policy tendencies, but do not amount to a coherent, united, let alone 
dominant nationalist ‘school’ in foreign policy. 
4) Nationalism rarely impacts foreign policy directly. It is certainly part of the 
ideological arsenal of foreign policy makers. However, the default official 
position of Russian foreign policy is a pragmatic Realist world-view based on 
interests. 
5) Typically, the regime tries to utilise nationalism instrumentally for domestic 
legitimacy; it tries both to exploit and to limit such nationalism, not always 
successfully. 
6) When nationalism does impact foreign policy more directly, this is in conditions 
of regime instability, when its domestic legitimacy is threatened, and outside 
systemic factors (e.g. Coloured Revolutions, NATO expansion) make elites feel 
vulnerable. 
7) Following such crises, the regime tries to reassert control over the nationalist 
agenda. 
8) However, the ‘bait-and-switch’ tactic risks provoking nationalist groups and 
demands in wider society, that then prove difficult to control. 
  
Future questions and themes  
 
Testing the above propositions is not easy, and needs a multilevel approach with 
detailed investigation both of regime dynamics and policy making. Approaches that are 
derived too closely from system-level theories of IR are unlikely to be revealing.  
The main weakness afflicting all approaches to RFP is lack of access to the 
policy-making ‘black box’. Despite official secrecy, demystifying the Russian foreign 
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policy making process to identify intentions, not just outcomes, and to isolate the real 
(not alleged) role of nationalists is vital. Interviewing policy-makers and experts with 
inside knowledge is clearly difficult, but in principle methodologically possible and 
essential. For instance, there are still major divergences between the ‘collective Putin’ 
view of the president as largely an arbiter of elite interests (Götz, 2016) and those who 
see him as having the last word on essential decisions (Zygarʹ, 2016). 
In the probable absence of much necessary information, there is still scope for 
familiar investigations into the role of nationalist thinkers and think-tanks, and of 
nationalist ideas in public debates. Recent research is beginning to focus on newer 
groups and figures (such as the Izborskii Club and the Sputnik i Pogrom blog) (e.g. 
Laruelle, 2016). However, Laruelle is right to propose moving away from focussing on 
ideologues towards policy processes. This chapter’s model can be tested and developed 
in order to systematise and link such research directions, particularly if it is applied to 
within-case comparisons over space and time (cf. Götz, 2016). Analysing the 
development of Russia’s policy towards different post-Soviet states will help theorise 
the degree to which ‘nationalism’ is a consistent feature of its policy, or rather, as is 
probable, only those most attracted by the Western ‘Other.’ 
Similarly, since the Russian regime’s relationship with nationalism is a moving 
target, there is scope for reviewing over-hasty contemporaneous assumptions with the 
benefit of hindsight. For example, immediately after the ‘conservative turn’ and 
Crimean annexation, it became axiomatic that Russian nationalism had become a 
mainstream element in Russian foreign policy making for the first time. However, a 
longer-term view indicates first, that the miscegenation of nationalism and foreign 
policy had already started with the 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict; second, that after the 
Crimean intervention, the familiar pattern of elite repression of nationalism reasserted 
itself, with the sidelining of nationalist groups at home and in the Donbas (Kolstø, 
2016b), and the de-escalation of Ukraine as a subject of public concern. Therefore in 
the longue durée, the Crimean intervention might look far less exceptional.  
Moreover, research in the ideational development of Russian nationalism and 
foreign policy might usefully develop more sophisticated methods of process-tracing 
and discourse analysis in order to avoid more impressionistic accounts of the alleged 
influence of nationalist ideas on debate (Beach and Pedersen, 2013; Götz, 2016). A 
recent paper by Frear and Mazepus (2017), which traces the ideational themes in 
official policy documents, shows a usefully replicable and simple methodology.   
Another highly relevant theme is Russia’s direct sponsoring of nationalists 
abroad. Russia’s aid to the Donbas rebellion remains more dominated by sensationalist 
journalistic accounts than serious analysis and fuller accounts of the so-called 
‘nationalist international’ remain forthcoming (Shekhovtsov, 2018). This work is 
focussed on the radical right, but there is need also to focus on the European radical 
left, who retain a Russophile constituency. There are many questions to explore, such 
as the role of ideology versus instrumentality, and the nature of support, be it financial, 
logistical, or moral.   
Overall, there remains a compelling need for more nuanced and less normative 
accounts of nationalism that do not assume a priori that Russian nationalism is bad and 
aggressive (Laruelle, 2014). Indeed, the degree to which Russian nationalism is sui 
generis and predisposed to authoritarian and aggressive overtones needs to be a 
research question corroborated by extensive data rather than a normative truism. To 
this end, there is clearly scope for analyses that explore the impact of nationalism on 
foreign policy in comparative context, not solely via single-country case studies. 
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Conclusion 
 
The above analysis has surveyed the disparate field of nationalism and foreign policy. 
It has argued that focussing on nationalism is an important element to understanding 
contemporary RFP, providing that it is understood as a multifaceted and multilevel 
phenomenon interlinking different discursive and policy fields, domestic and foreign, 
but not a homogenous variable that in any way ‘drives’ Russian foreign policy, either 
in general or towards the West.   
Many approaches to Russian nationalism are derived (explicitly or not) from 
macro-level IR theories. These provide insights, but struggle to offer a sufficiently 
nuanced and flexible account able to address the variable role of nationalism in RFP. 
In particular, realist accounts largely dismiss nationalism’s function, whereas liberal 
accounts largely exaggerate it as an ideological underpinning for regime actions. 
Constructivist approaches are better at showing how nationalist views interact with 
domestic national identity debates; however, they tend to exaggerate the homogeneity 
of nationalist constituencies, while lacking sufficient attention to how nationalists 
interact with policy processes. 
Only multi-level accounts which focus on how nationalism interacts with 
regime policy-making, legitimacy and intra-regime networks can fully identify the 
nationalism-RFP nexus, and only by taking account of both the ideational influence of 
nationalism and the policy context of its proponents. This is a topic needing detailed 
longitudinal empirical investigation and comparative analysis, and this chapter has 
provided a model that will help illuminate this research direction. Fortunately or 
otherwise, the recent direction of the Russian regime indicates that the topic of Russian 
nationalism and foreign policy is unlikely to lose salience any time soon.   
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